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The EU Export Controls Regime: Dual-Use Goods  
and Technologies in the European Legal Framework
by Hamed alavi* and TaTsiana KHamicHonaK**
Abstract. Dual-use items, including software and technology, can be used for both civil and military purposes. 
Export control of such items is an important constituent part of security policies of exporter states. These measures 
are aimed at avoiding proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.1 The nature of dual-use goods intrigues 
imposition of control over exporting them to unfriendly countries or those ‘sensitive’ in terms of their ambiguous 
considerations of foreign policies.2 Some category of goods may be banned for export, whilst others are legitimate 
products that further technological development and strengthen international economic ties. The aim of the 
exporter states is to seek balance between safeguarding security objectives whilst not undermining competitiveness 
of local businesses. The paper explores the EU framework for regulating exports of dual-use goods as well as the 
EU participation in the international export controls regimes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The EU export controls regime has experienced development of competences over the years 
since the first Council Regulation3 of 1994, when the initial step was made towards a 
Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use goods.4 The Lisbon Treaty 
allocated dual-use goods and technologies under the EU’s control of exports of dual-use 
goods and technologies under the EU’s trade policy instead of the preceding common 
market and competition rules, resulted in Member States gradually surrendering exclusive 
control of dual-use goods’ exports authorization procedures to the European Commission. 
Today an authorization is required in the form of a license for all non-EU transfers of 
indicated items, whereas intra-EU circulation is harmonized and simplified to a certain 
extent. This regime is not without pitfalls, as the Commission is only exercising partial 
control over the respective Member States’ decisions. Another weak link is the lowest 
common denominator harmonization of respective rules Member States apply to regulate 
export controls.
The paper gives an outline of the existing export controls regime in the EU as shaped 
by the relatively short history of relevant Union legislation. An overview is given of the 
provisions of Council Regulation 428/2009 and of the role of the major export controls 
groups, i.e. the Wassenaar Agreement, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), 
the Australia Group (AG) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The pitfalls of the EU 
export controls regime are also assessed, weighted and the currently negotiated amendments 
to the regime are addressed.
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1 Micara (2012) 578–593.
2 Micara (2012) 578.
3 Council Regulation 3381/94 (1994).
4 Fiott (2013) .
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2. THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EU INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS  
IN THE AREA OF EXPORT CONTROLS
Export Controls is a trade instrument, specifically designated to uphold international 
security objectives in the framework of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD). The threats to security and safety are high due to the emergence of various 
forms of terrorism and the efforts of state- and non-state actors to acquire WMD and 
complementary technologies. It is estimated that up to 10% of exports from the EU is 
allocated to dual-use goods and technologies with over 5000 companies engaged in the 
export of controlled dual-use items.5Annex I to the Regulation No 428/2009 illustrates, that 
dual-use goods are extremely broadly interpreted covering such industries, including inter 
alia, nuclear, biological, chemical as well as computers, telecommunications, encryption, 
navigation and avionics. Due to their nature, dual-use goods are state-of-the-art advanced 
items that can only be acquired globally from a very limited number of states-exporters. 
Many of the states-exporters belong to all or some of the four international export controls 
regimes: the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement. They all operate with the mandate of 
preventing dual-use items being used for military purposes or the production of WMD.6 
However, not all of exporting states are committed to controlling exports of dual-use items 
or establishing efficient export-control regimes. The inefficient or inexistent control makes 
a number of sensitive items available on the market. Foreign availability of dual-use goods 
is one of the major considerations, that affects the decision of whether to exercise control 
due to the need of balancing security concerns with economic development and 
competitiveness of EU exporters on the global market.
The UN Security Council has consistently affirmed that the proliferation of nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons constitutes a threat to international peace and security.7 
The existing WMD non-proliferation national and international measures and the systems 
of implementation raise doubts about their effectiveness when considering the nuclear 
potential of India, Israel and Pakistan or North Korea to international peace and security.8 
These worries brought global WMD non-proliferation efforts to the forefront of security 
concerns. An important constituent part of WMD non-proliferation is a strong system of 
export controls of dual-use goods and technologies. The 1980s transfers of sensitive items 
by individuals and companies from within the EU indicate the need for effective export 
control provisions, as well as mechanisms of their monitoring and implementation.9 
In Resolution 1540, the Security Council called upon the UN Member States to refrain 
from providing any support to non-state actors, who attempt to acquire WMD, and effective 
domestic non-proliferation controls where established in conjunction with a strengthening 
of their international commitments to facilitate this policy.10
  5 European Commission Green Paper tutee for European Studies, VUB, Belgium. Civil and 
military purposes. Export control of such oneness in a changing world Paper tutee for Europe.
  6 European Commission Green Paper (2011) 4 .
  7 UNSC Resolution 687 (1991) .
  8 Wetter (2009) .
  9 The Abdul Qadeer Khan network of private actors sold sensitive products and technology 
while exploiting the Dutch market. In 1990s German companies selling sensitive items to Iraq were 
exposed. See Wetter (2009) 2. 
10 UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) .
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The European Council adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS)11 in 2003, which 
identifies proliferation of WMD as the greatest threat to security, outweighing terrorism, 
organized crime, regional conflicts and state failure. The Council, with the ESS, adopted the 
WMD Strategy and its Plan of Action.12 The measures in Chapter III of the Strategy, 
referred as the ‘living action plan’, focus on the implementation and strengthening of the 
EU WMD non-proliferation strategy throughout all available instruments. The instruments 
including, nationally- and internationally-coordinated export controls, multilateral treaties, 
verification mechanisms and threat reduction programs.13 The Strategy refers to export 
controls particularly the strengthening export control strategies and practices in cooperation 
with partners; reinforcing efficiency of export controls in the enlarged Europe; providing 
assistance with technical knowledge in the area of export controls; reinforcing export 
controls with regard to intangible transfers of dual-use technology and facilitating 
information exchange between Member States.14 
The EU has grown from 15 to 28 Member States since the adoption of the WMD 
Strategy in 2003. The enlargements have changed the inner dynamics of the EU and the 
effectiveness of the system of export controls in the larger Europe has come into question.15 
The WMD Strategy prioritize the enhancement of EU export control policies but, many 
newly incorporated states did not have effective export controls and were not members of 
the four export control regimes.16 The implications were that their accession would provide 
access to the EU common market, where the free movement of dual-use goods was 
established, and would create a proliferation threat. The resolution of this issue was a high 
priority in 2005-2006, when the peer review of export controls in current and acceding 
countries, provided for in the WMD Strategy, was completed.17 In 2008, the Council 
adopted the accession would provide access to the EU common market, where the free 
movement of dual-use goods was established, and would their delivery systems which 
reflects on the efforts and outcomes of the implementation of the WMD Strategy and sought 
further strengthening it.18 The report reaffirmed that WMD misappropriated by terrorists or 
non-state actors constitute re the free moeatest security challenges which Europeans may 
have ever faced.’19 Therefore, the relevancy of the WMD Strategy of 2003 shall not be 
underestimated and should be considered, with importance even more so that it realises the 
UNSC Regulation 1540 guidelines, which are the cornerstone of international non-
proliferation strategies.20
11 UNSC Resolution 1540 Better World’, European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 
2003 .
12 EU strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 15708/03, Brussels, 10 
December 2003.
13 EU strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2003), 0329.
14 EU strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2003).
15 Anthony (2013).
16 Anthony (2013) 17.
17 Anthony (2013) 18.
18 Council Conclusions 17172/08, Brussels, 17 December 2008.
19 Council Conclusions 17172/08, 3.
20 Council Conclusions 17172/08, 4.
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2.1. EU participation in international export controls groups
The EU and Member States participate in the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement, 
the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, in different 
capacities. 
The Australia Group (AG) is an informal commitment, through which countries 
undertake to ensure that exports do not contribute to the development of chemical and 
biological weapons, This is realized by harmonizing national export control measures in 
pursuit of the fulfilment of their obligations under the Chemical Weapons and Bio- and 
Toxic Weapons Conventions. All the AG participants are State Parties to both Conventions 
and the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The first meeting of the then 15 participants and the 
European Commission took place in 1985 in Brussels as a response to the 1984 UN 
discoveries of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons (nerve agents and sulphur mustard) in 
violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. With the evolution of threats and the variety of the 
dual-use materials that can be used in the production of chemical and biological weapons, 
specific biological agents were included in the scope of AG cooperation in the early 1990s. 
The harmonization of exports among the AG members is achieved through licensing exports 
of certain chemicals, bio-agents and dual-use chemical and bio-manufacturing facilities. 
The number of AG members has grown from 15 in 1985 to 41 and includes the EU as a 
member of its own right.21
The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and 
Dual-use Goods and Technologies is an intergovernmental arrangement established in July 
1996 by 33 states including the U.S., Great Britain, Russia, France, Canada and Japan.22 
The WA replaced CoCom, which was no longer considered to be an appropriate basis for 
export controls, but unlike CoCom, WA is open to all countries on a non-discriminatory 
basis, and is not directed against any state or group of states, and many of former Warsaw 
Pact countries are now members of WA. The WA members undertake to ensure that transfers 
of conventional arms and dual-use items do not contribute to the development of military 
capabilities and do not undermine international and regional peace and security.23 The WA 
particularly seeks to complement and reinforce the existing control regimes for WMD and 
their delivery systems; enhances cooperation to prevent the acquisition of arms and dual-
use items by terrorist groups and organizations as well as by states and other end-users, 
if the situation in the region becomes a cause of serious concern.24 As of 2012, the number 
of WA participants increased to 41 states with the European Commission participating 
within the delegations of EU presidencies.
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is an informal association of states 
established by Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the U.S. in 1987. 
The association’stablished by Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the U.S. 
inable of WMD delivery and to coordinate the participating states’ national licensing efforts. 
After the events of 9/11, the focus has also been directed to the prevention of WMD 
proliferation by terrorist groups and individuals, by monitoring the transfers of missile 
equipment, material and related technologies capable of delivering WMD. The MTCR has 
21 See at <http://www.australiagroup.net/en/index.html> accessed 13 December 2015.
22 August (2013).
23 August (2013) 396.
24 Wassenaar Arrangement Guidelines & Procedures, including the Initial Elements, 1996 with 
amendments . 
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no permanent organization. Its activities are based on the MTCR Guidelines and the 
Equipment, Software and Technology Annex, which lay down rules of participation and 
export control guidelines for the Annex items.25 Currently, there are 34 members with the 
European Commission participating within the delegations of EU presidencies.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a group of nuclear supplier countries that aims 
at non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. NSG operates by the Non-Proliferation Principle 
through the implementation of two sets of Guidelines for nuclear and nuclear-related 
exports, which implement various binding international instruments in the field of nuclear 
non-proliferation: the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), as well 
as a number of regional agreements. The NSG was created in 1974 following the Indian 
nuclear explosion, which showed that nuclear technology transferred for peaceful purposes 
can be misused. In 2013, there were 46 members with the European Commission and the 
Chair of the Zangger Committee26 participating as observers.27
3. THE FORMATION OF EU EXPORT CONTROLS REGIME
The EU export controls regime is governed by Regulation (EC) No 428/2009, which 
establishes common control rules and a list of controlled items. While the regulation is 
binding and directly applicable throughout the EU, it is up to the Member States to adopt 
policies to implement the Regulation’olicies to implement the Regulationerned by 
Regulation (EC) No 428/2009, which establishes common control rules and a list of 
controlled items. While the regulation is bindihat when the Union has exclusive competence 
in a specific area, the Member States are precluded from legislating in that area unless 
specifically authorized by the EU. This, however, was not always the case and the history of 
the Regulation’s adoption shows a significant shift of competences from the Member States 
to the EU .
3.1. Developments preceding the adoption of Regulation No. 428/2009
Historically, most of the EU Member States have established national export regimes and 
participated in international agreements in order to harmonize their export controls systems 
and ensure WMD non-proliferation. During the Cold War the western countries’their export 
controls systems and ensure WMD non-proli28 countries and overseen by the Coordinating 
Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls (CoCom).29 It was created in 1949 at 
the initiative of the U.S. between the U.S., Japan and the NATO states except Iceland. 
25 See at <http://www.mtcr.info/english/index.html> accessed 13 December 2015.
26 Zangger Committee, a.k.a. Non-Proliferation Treaty Exporters’ Committee, was established 
in 1971, one year after the NPT came into force. The Committee coordinated the member states’ 
interpretations of the NPT’s export control provision, which requires exporters to seek International 
Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) safeguards in order to supply nuclear items that are capable of 
‘processing, use, or production of special fissionable material’. Zangger Committee is less active now 
with the creation of the NSG. August, Mayer, Bixby (2013) 397.
27 See at <http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en/> accessed 13 December 2015
28 The Warsaw Treaty Organization, a.k.a. the Warsaw Pact, was a political and military alliance 
between the USSR, Albania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and the German 
Democratic Republic, established in 1955 to counterbalance the NATO. The Pact was terminated in 
July 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union.
29 Micara (2012) 578–593.
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The CoCom With its headquarters in Paris was designed to prevent the Eastern bloc from 
acquiring crucial Western technology and operated three lists of items that should not be 
exported to the Soviet Union and its allies.30
The established systems of export controls by the individual CoCom participating 
countries with the exclusion of the European institutions negatively impacted the intra-
community and external trade.31 The absence of a harmonized Community regime of export 
controls, and the discrepancies in national systems constituted obstacles to internal trade 
impaired the free movement of goods within the internal market. This was illustrated by the 
case Aime Richardt and Les accessoires scientifiques SNC32, which dealt with the unlawful 
transit of certain goods without a license through the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. Mr. 
Richardt, the director of Les Accessoires Scientifiques, prepared to deliver a ten-inch Veeco 
Microetch (used in the production of bubble memory circuits) to Technopromimport, 
established in Moscow. After the necessary formalities were completed in France, the direct 
flight Paris-Moscow was cancelled and the item was transported by lorry to the Luxembourg 
airport, where it was seized. The seizure occurred because the item was claimed to be 
accompanied by ‘inaccurate declarations in order to conceal its strategic nature and to 
permit its transit to the USSR’ contrary to Luxembourg laws that required a special transit 
license.33 In its ruling, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) referred to 
Article 36 of the EEC Treaty, whose purpose is to allow Member States to derogate from 
the principle of free movement of goods to secure the interests that Article 36 protects.34 
It provides that the measures that a Member State may employ the justified objective and 
should not restrict the intra-Community trade more than absolutely necessary.35 The security 
objective invoked to justify the authorization requirement concerns, for the purposes of 
Article 36 EEC Treaty, was both state’s external and internal security. This in conjunction 
with the transit and export of dual-use goods may affect a state’s public security, led the 
Court to decide that Luxembourg had the right to require a special authorization for the 
transit of the item in question and its subsequent confiscation.36 The judgment illustrated 
that the internal market lacked effective integration with regard to dual-use goods and 
technology, and a harmonized system of export controls was required. 
In order to bring dual-use goods and technology into the common market by 
eliminating border controls between Member States, and to coordinate and strengthen 
control over exports to third countries, the Commission submitted a proposal in 1992 for a 
Regulation on the control of exports of certain dual-use as well as nuclear goods and 
technologies.37 Five criteria have been indicated in order for border controls to be 
eliminated: the common list of dual-use goods subject to control; the common list of 
destination countries; common criteria for issuing export licenses for third-country exports; 
a mechanism for coordination and enforcement of licenses and, procedures for administrative 
cooperation between the licensing authorities and customs offices.38
30 Gregory (1987) 863–882.
31 Micara (2012) 581.
32 Richardt and ‘Les accessoires scientifiques’ [1991] ECR C-367/89
33 Richardt and ‘Les accessoires scientifiques’ (1991), §§ 3–5 .
34 Richardt and ‘Les accessoires scientifiques’(1991), §§ 19–20 .
35 Richardt and ‘Les accessoires scientifiques’(1991), § 20 .
36 Richardt and ‘Les accessoires scientifiques’ (1991), §§ 22–23 .
37 COM(92) 317 .
38 Leslie (1994) 193–211 .
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The Council adopted Regulation No. 3381/94 following the Commission proposal. 
The Regulation was adopted based on Article 113 of the EC Treaty and became part of the 
EU Common Commercial Policy (CCP). The Council adopted Decision 94/942/CFSP on 
the Joint Action at the same time. The Joint Action was adopted within the framework of 
the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Regulation provided for a system of 
licenses applicable to dual-use items, whereas the Joint Action prescribed a list of items to 
be controlled in conformity with the international export control regimes, which Member 
States should take into account when granting licensing. The two instruments regulated 
identical issues but coexisted in parallel because of their different legal basis and the 
separation of power. The new export control system affected did away with the concerns 
identified in the Richardt case through the mutual recognition of licenses between Member 
States .39 The two instruments experienced a conflict of interest particularly in the area of 
decision-making despite being designed as an ‘integrated system’40. Thus, under Article 
113, decisions about certain sensitive issues are to be resolved under Qualified Majority 
Voting (QMV), which Member States were reluctant to rely on.41 Whereas the Commission 
favored a single European strategy in the area of export controls of dual-use goods, the 
Member States did not wish to sacrifice their competence in deciding on the controlled 
goods and export guidelines. 
Two hallmark CJEU judgments were the trigger to remove with the two-tier export 
controls approach. In the Leifer and Werner cases, the Court ruled that exports of dual-use 
goods must fall exclusively under the CCP. The Court broadly interpreted the CCP, to 
emphasize that exports of dual-use goods should be treated as trade measures because of 
their nature, instead of measures having security and foreign policy objectives.42 CCP is an 
exclusive competence of the EU, and thus the Member States are effectively precluded 
from acting in this area except with a special authorization.43 In line with the judgments, the 
Commission argued that an EU-wide export control regime is necessary, as it will further 
the completion of the common market; form strong boundaries on its frontiers and a 
common export control system will provide greater legal certainty, reducing the burden on 
exporters as well as establishing a level playing field.44 
In 2000, the Council Decision on Joint Action was repealed and Regulation 1334/2000 
was adopted exclusively under Article 113 EC Treaty, which unified the former two-tier 
system of rules in one instrument. A common EU export controls regime was established 
but, some important limitations remained. For example, lists of controlled items are 
included into the Regulation’s text, they are implemented uniformly by the Member States 
and can be amended in the framework of Commission proposals. However, the proposed 
amendments to the controlled goods are performed on the basis of the respective agreements 
of the Member States within the international export control regimes. This limits the 
Commission’s powers as it only participates in the Australia Group in its own right. Along 
the same line of reasoning, with the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007, the unequal 
membership of acceding states in international regimes posed further proliferation concerns 
39 Micara (2012) 582.
40 Micara (2012) 582.
41 Suzuki (2007).
42 Micara (2012) 583.
43 Craig (2011).
44 Suzuki (2007) 4.
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with regard to export controls and the free circulation of controlled items within the internal 
market.45
On 18 December 2006, the Commission submitted a proposal for the amendment and 
recast of Regulation 1334/2000.46 The proposal followed the 2004 peer review of the 
Regulation’s implementation by the Member States, conducted in conformity with the 
Thessaloniki WMD Strategy and Action Plan in order to meet the standards of the UNSC 
Resolution 1540. The proposal meant to strengthen the EU dual-use export control regime, 
providing more clarity whilst reducing the regulatory burdens in implementing export 
control requirements by EU exporters. Overall, the proposal sought to balance the objectives 
of the EU WMD Strategy in the framework of international non-proliferation commitments 
with promoting competitiveness of EU industry and ‘creating the EU of high technology 
jobs’.47 The major proposed items that exceed the technical revision of the Regulation were: 
the adoption of the ‘comitology’ procedure for the amendment of annexes; the replacement 
of authorization requirement for Annex V items with a pre-notification procedure; the 
introduction of appropriate civil and criminal penalties to be applied by the Member 
States for violation of the Regulation’s provisions; the legal security for the export of dual 
use items, particularly with respect to third-country legislations; and the introduction of 
a negotiation mechanism with third-countries concerning such issues as re-export 
requirements.48 Even though the mentioned comitology procedure would have resulted in 
an accelerated process of updating lists of controlled items in conformity with the export 
control regimes, the proposed provision was blocked by the Council and did not find its 
way in the recast.49
3.2. Key provisions in Regulation 428/2009
The recast Regulation 428/2009 entered into force in August 2009 and reinforced the 
Community General Export Authorization (CGEA) for non-EU transfers of certain items, 
listed in Annex II.50 Article 9(2) and Annex III provide that for all other exports that are 
subject to an authorization requirement, exporting companies shall obtain a license, which 
is meant to prevent them from cherry-picking and exporting from a Member State with less 
stringent requirements.51 There are four types of licenses under the EU export control 
regime. 
1) The CGEA allows the export of certain dual-use items to certain destinations under 
certain conditions. There are currently six CGEAs: 
a) exports to Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, 
Liechtenstein and the U.S.; 
b) exports of some types of dual-use items to identified destinations;
c) exports after repair or replacement; 
45 Micara (2012) 584–585.
46 Proposal for a Council Regulation setting up a Community regime for the control of exports 
of dual-use items and technology, COM(2006) 829 final, Brussels, 18.12.2006.
47 Communication from the Commission on the Review of the EC Regime of Controls of 
Exports of Dual-Use Items and Technology, Brussels, 18.12.2006, COM(2006) 828 final.
48 COM(2006) 828 final 8.
49 Micara (2012) 588.
50 Regulation 428/2009, Article 9.
51 Fiott (2013) 16 .
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d) temporary exports for exhibition or fair; 
e) telecommunications; 
f) Chemicals.52 
2) National General Export Authorizations (NGEA) should be issued by Member 
States to exporters established or resident in the authorizing state if they do not overlap 
with items listed in part 2 of Annex II, and/or meet the requirements set out in the Regulation 
and national legislation.53 Currently, NGEAs are applied in France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK.54 The Commission shall be notified of any NGEA 
issued or modified by a Member State.
3) Global Export Authorizations cover several items in several countries of destination 
or several end-users .
4) Individual licenses are granted by national authorities to an exporter to cover exports 
of one or more dual-use items to one end-user in a non-EU country. All four types of 
licenses are granted or denied by the Member State authorities, whereas it is required to 
notify the Commission of export license refusals.55
Furthermore, Article 4, in conjunction with Article 8 of the recast Regulation introduces 
a ‘gulation introduces aticle 8 of the recast Rhorities, whereas it is required to notify the 
Commission of export license refusals.nd-user in a non-EU country. All four types of 
licenses in pan particular, Article 4(1) states that an authorization for unlisted items may be 
required if the exporter has information that the items may be intended for the production 
and development of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive 
devices or missiles capable of delivering such weapons. Also, authorization should be 
required if unlisted items are meant to be transferred to a country subject to an arms 
embargo. And when the exporter has information that the items are intended for is required 
to noti
At present, the EU regime of export control of dual-use items consists of Regulation 
(EC) No. 428/2009 and the Council Joint Action 2000/401/CFSR56. EU export controls is 
claimed to be he Council Joint Action 2000/401/CFSRed to notify the Commission57 
The Regulation is binding and directly applicable in the Member States, whereas the Joint 
Action is an intergovernmental cooperation instrument, adopted under the TEU provisions, 
and which has to be transposed into the Member States’ national legislations.58 
The Regulation has been subsequently substantially amended by Council Regulation (EC) 
No. 1232/2011, and items listed in Annex I of the Regulation were amended by Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 388/2012 after the review of the control lists of the Wassenaar 
Arrangement, the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group during 2009–2010.
52 European Commission Factsheet on The EU Dual Use Export Control Regime, 07/02/2014. 
Available at < http://ec.europa.eu/trade/import-and-export-rules/export-from-eu/dual-use-controls/> 
accessed 13 December 2015.
53 Article 9 (4).
54 Commission factsheet, UNSC Resolution 687 (1991).
55 Fiott (2013) 16 .
56 Council Joint Action of 22 June 2000 concerning the control of technical assistance related to 
certain military end-uses, 2000/401/CFSP, L 159/216.
57 Chapman (2013) .
58 Michel (2014).
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4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Article 25 of Regulation 428/2009 states that every three years the European Commission 
shall review its implementation and present a report to the European Parliament and the 
Council identifying possible areas of reform. In 2011 the Commission launched a public 
consultation with the stakeholders concerning the functioning of the current EU export 
control regime of dual-use items.59 Once again, it was stressed that the biggest challenge for 
the EU is to reconcile the foreign and security objectives with the economic and security 
objectives. Within the current export controls framework, multiple challenges have been 
identified by the Member States and other interested parties during the course of public 
consultation, which command the dynamic enhancement of the export controls regime in 
the changing world. The challenges include the growing importance of emerging economies, 
the emergence of new and advanced technologies and the evolution of security risks and 
threats (terrorism and acquisition by State and non-state actors of WMD).60 The 
consultations and the changes to control lists in the export controls regimes over the course 
of 2011 and 2013 led the Commission to submit in October 2014 a Proposal to amend 
Annex I of Regulation 428/2000.61
The historic formation of the European export controls regime has experienced a 
significant shift of competences from the Member States to the Commission. However, the 
need remains to strike a balance between the Commission’e Commis and the Member 
States’ competences. In view of the EU enlargements and the clear discrepancies in 
economic and technological development between the older Members and the more recently 
acceded Members, a more integrated and overarching export controls mechanism is 
mandatory. Particularly, the Council suggests in the conclusions of the Review of the export 
control system that adequate information-sharing and transparency among the Member 
States and a closer cooperation with the private sector is required. This could potentially 
include the ‘E-licensing system’ for simplifying administrative procedures and data 
exchange, as well as a possible introduction of European General Export Authorizations 
(EGEAs) for facilitating low-risk trade among European companies. In accordance with 
current discussion, authors of this paper believe providing proper response to existing 
challenges for EU export control regime consist answers to current questions on its 
performance in areas of human security, technical advancements, intangible means of 
technology transfer, and unclear legal terminology existing in the text of regulation. For this 
purpose further cooperation with partner countries and establishing a continuous dialogue 
with trading partners, the movement towards global governance model; the reduction of 
practical divergences amongst EU member states; the definition of more efficient 
investigative measures for in transit and transshipment controls, the removal of problems 
on the way for enforcement of controls, and improving collaboration with exporters should 
be considered in further revision of existing regulation or introduction of new European 
Export Control Regime on dual-use items.
59 COM(2011) 393 final.
60 Commission Staff Working Document, Strategic export controls: ensuring security and 
competitiveness in a changing world. A report on the public consultation launched under the Green 
Paper COM(2011) 393, SWD(2013) 7 final, Brussels, 17.1.2013.
61 Commission Delegated Regulation amending Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 setting 
up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual use items, 
C(2014) 7567 final, Brussels, 22.10.2014.
249THE EU EXPORT CONTROLS REGIME: DUAL-USE GOODS AND TECHNOLOGIES...
LITERATURE
Anthony, I., Grip, L., ‘Strengthening the European Union’s Future Approach to WMD non-
proliferation’ (2013) 37 SIPRI Policy Paper 37.
August, R., Mayer, D., Bixby, M., International Business Law (6th edn, Pearson Education Limited 
2013) .
Chapman, B ., Export Controls: A Contemporary History (University Press of America 2013).
Craig, P., Búrca, G., EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (5th edn, Oxford University Press 2011)
Fiott, D., Prizeman, K., ‘The Arms Trade Treaty and the Control of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies’ 
(2013) 1 IES Working Paper.
Gregory, J. E., ‘Controlling the Transfer of Military Significant Technology: COCOM After Toshiba’ 
(1987) 4 Fordham International Law Journal 863–882 .
Leslie, B. J., ‘Dual Use Goods and the European Community: Problems and Prospects in Eliminating 
Internal Border Controls on Sensitive Products’ (1994) 1 Boston College International and 
Comparative Law Review 193–211 .
Micara, A. G., ‘Current Features of the European union regime for Export Control of Dual-Use 
Goods’ (2012) 4 Journal of Common Market Studies 578–593.
Michel, Q., The European Union Dual-Use Items Control Regime, Comment of the Legislation 
article-by-article, ESU Non-Proliferation, January 2014.
Suzuki, K. , ‘Between Trade and Security: EU’s Export Control Regime and Its Global Role’ (2007) 
Paper for EUSA Tenth Biennial International Conference, May 17-May 19, 2007, Montreal, 
Canada, available at < http://aei.pitt.edu/8044/1/suzuki-k-04f.pdf> accessed 13 December 2015.
Wasserstein, R. L., Lazar, N. A., ‘The ASA’s Statement on P-Values: Context, Process, and Purpose’ 
(2016) 2 The American Statistician 129-133. 
Wetter, A ., Enforcing European Union Law on Exports of Dual-use Goods . SIPRI Research Report 
No. 24 (Oxford University Press 2009).
